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1.  Background.   A movement is underway across the U.S. to reform jury instructions, the 
instructions that a judge reads to the jurors before they repair to the jury room to reach a verdict.  
California revised its jury instructions in 2003, because jurors found many of them 
incomprehensible and sometimes returned misinformed verdicts (Benson, 1984; Marder, 2006).  
As (1) illustrates, Massachusetts' instructions pose the same problem. 
(1) Negligence is the failure of a responsible person, either by omission or by 
action, to exercise that degree of care, diligence, and forethought which, in 
the discharge of the duty then resting on him or her, the person of ordinary 
caution and prudence ought to exercise under the particular circumstances.  
It is a want of diligence commensurate with the requirement of the duty at the 
moment imposed by the law...
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Full of linguistic features that tax comprehension -- passive verbs (Gough 1966; Ferreira 2003), 
nominalizations (Klare 1973), negatives (Wason 1972; Just & Clark 1973; Just & Carpenter 
1976; Cutler 1983), omitted arguments; low-frequency, formal-register, and presupposed or 
undefined terminology), such instructions have been shown to confuse even highly educated 
jurors, never mind jurors with less education or non-native English skills (Charrow & Charrow 
1979; Elwork, et. al. 1982; Diamond & Levi 1996; Diamond 2003; Tiersma 1999, 2001, 2009).   
In our 2013 LSA talk (Randall et. al, 2013), Massachusetts Plain English Jury Instruction 
Project), we showed that current instructions are harder to understand than Plain English 
versions.  But, difficulty varied, and here we show why.  Two specific linguistic features 
correlate with comprehension rates: (1) passive verbs and (2) presupposed terms.  Subjects score 
high on instructions with low rates of both passives and presupposed terms, and vice versa.   
2.  Earlier research (Randall et. al. 2013).  We hypothesized that (1) Current Jury Instructions 
are harder to understand than Plain English Jury Instructions and (2) processing difficulty will 
vary based on linguistic factors.  In this study, two groups of subjects (29 in each), all 
Northeastern University students, listened to digital recordings of six instructions (plus one 
“warm-up”) and answered true/false questions after each instruction.  Group 1 heard Current 
Instructions, Group 2, Plain English Instructions.  As Figure 1 shows, the proportion of 
questions correctly answered by ≥ 90% of subjects different significantly in the two groups:  
30% for Current instructions vs. 52% for Plain English (p < .05).  
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Figure 1.  Proportion of questions answered correctly by ≥ 90% of subjects 
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However, as Figure 2 shows, the Current Jury Instructions were not found to be equally difficult.  
Comprehension rates for Instructions 1-2 were significantly higher than 3-6:  88-89% vs. 61-77%  
(z = -3.12, p < .01).  The question we left unanswered was:  Why? 
 
 
  
 
3.  The current study. In this follow-up, we hypothesized that the variation across the Current 
Jury Instructions (Figure 3a) would be related to two linguistic factors,  passive verbs (3b) and 
presupposed terms (3c).  And this was the case.  The results clustered in two groups: “easy” 
Instructions 1 & 2 had lower rates of these factors; “difficult” Instructions 3-6, higher rates. 
 
  
 
 
 
Consequently, the switch to Plain English had a greater impact on Instructions 3-6, as shown in 
Figure 4a.  As we would predict, the greatest difference, for Instruction 6 (circled), 61% vs. 82%  
(z = -2.86, p < .01), corresponds to the greatest differences in the rates of (4b) passive verbs (5% 
vs. 1%) and (4c) presupposed terms (2% vs. 0%). The other five instructions showed similar 
correlations between improvement and rates of these two factors (not reported here). The 
difference in language of the two versions of Instruction 6 are displayed in Figure 5, with 
passives shown in square brackets and presupposed terms in curly brackets. 
 
Figure 2.  Subject Performance:  Current Jury Instructions 
Figure 3a. Subject Performance: Current Jury Instructions            Figure 3c.  Presupposed terms / total words 
Figure 3b. Passive verbs / total words 
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4.  Conclusions and implications:  Our findings confirm our hypotheses: (1) Current jury 
instructions are more difficult to understand than Plain English jury instructions and (2) 
linguistic factors – passive verbs and presupposed terms – do contribute to processing difficulty.  
Lower rates of passive verbs and presupposed terms correlated with better comprehension; 
higher rates, with worse comprehension.  Thus, rewriting jury instructions in “Plain English,” 
with a specific focus on minimizing these factors can significantly improve comprehension.  In 
2005, the American Bar Association wrote: “All instructions to the jury should be in plain and 
understandable language” (Diamond et. al., 2012) yet, even now, collaborations between legal 
professionals and linguists are rare (Solan 1999; Solan & Tiersma 2005).  But results like ours 
suggest ways to implement reform.  If the legal community pays attention, linguistic evidence 
could play an important role in improving jurors’ understanding, making verdicts more reliable 
and the judicial system more fair. 
 
Figure 4a. Subject Performance: Current Jury Instructions     Figure 4c. Instruction 6: Presupposed terms/total words 
Figure 4b. Instruction 6: Passive verbs/total words 
Current Version 
There are two types of evidence that you may use to 
determine the facts of a case: direct evidence and 
circumstantial evidence. You have direct evidence 
where a witness {testifies directly} about the fact that 
[is to be proved], based on what (he/she) claims to 
have seen or heard or felt with (his/her) own senses, 
and the only question is whether you believe the 
witness. You have circumstantial evidence where no 
witness can {testify directly} about the fact [that is to 
be proved], but you [are presented] with evidence of 
other facts and then asked to draw reasonable 
inferences from them about the fact that [is to be 
proved].  (Brady et. al., 2008). 
 
Figure 5.  Jury Instruction 6:  Direct and Circumstantial Evidence 
Plain English Version 
You have heard evidence that you must use to decide 
what the facts are in this case.  There are two types of 
evidence. One type [is called] direct evidence, which 
is what a witness claims to have seen or heard or 
smelled.  So a witness saying that she saw a mailman 
put mail into her mailbox is direct evidence that the 
mailman delivered her mail.  The other type of 
evidence is indirect or “circumstantial” evidence.  A 
witness saying that she saw that her mailbox was 
empty when she left the house and full when she came 
home is indirect evidence that the mailman delivered 
her mail.  Indirect evidence allows you to reach the 
same conclusion as direct evidence, but you have to 
make an inference -- a logical connection -- to get 
there.  It makes no difference whether evidence is 
direct or indirect.  One is not better than the other. 
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